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Abstract—The best practice to prevent Cross Site Scripting
(XSS) attacks is to apply encoders to sanitize untrusted data. To
balance security and functionality, encoders should be applied to
match the web page context, such as HTML body, JavaScript,
and style sheets. A common programming error is the use of
a wrong type of encoder to sanitize untrusted data, leaving
the application vulnerable. We present a security unit testing
approach to detect XSS vulnerabilities caused by improper
encoding of untrusted data. Unit tests for the XSS vulnerability
are constructed out of each web page and then evaluated by a unit
test execution framework. A grammar-based attack generator is
devised to automatically generate test inputs. We also propose a
vulnerability repair technique that can automatically fix detected
vulnerabilities in many situations. Evaluation of this approach
has been conducted on an open source medical record application
with over 200 web pages written in JSP.
Index Terms—Vulnerability Detection, Vulnerability Repair,
Cross-site Scripting(XSS), Unit Testing, Software Reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
CROSS-SITE Scripting (XSS) is one of the most commonsecurity vulnerabilities in web applications. Cross Site
Scripting attacks occur when an attacker successfully injects a
malicious JavaScript payload into a web page to be executed
by users requesting that page. Advised best practice to prevent
XSS attacks is to encode untrusted program variables with dy-
namic content before their values are sent to the browser. The
Acunetix Web Application Vulnerability Report [1] showed
that nearly 38% and 33% of web sites were vulnerable to XSS
attacks in 2015 and 2016 respectively. While one can prevent
all XSS attacks by using the most strict encoder, that also takes
away many useful web site functions. To balance security and
functionality, developers must therefore choose the appropriate
encoder depending on the context of the content, such as
HTML or JavaScript. Research shows that as many as 28% of
encoders are used incorrectly [2]. Static analysis [3] techniques
are widely used to ensure a web application uses encoding
functions to sanitize untrusted data. However, static analysis
cannot verify whether the correct encoding function is applied.
Consider the fragment of a JSP program shown in Fig.1.
Native Java code is enclosed in <% and %>. This example
has two user-provided inputs: pid and addr. Variable pid is
used as part of rendering an HTML anchor element on line
3, and addr is displayed in the HTML body on line 4. A
maliciously supplied input for addr might be
<script> atk(); </script>
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1 <% String pid=(String)request.getPa c
rameter("pid");%>
2 <% String addr=(String)
request.getParameter("addr");%>
3 <a onclick="fn('<%=escapeHtml(pid)% c
>')" href="#" > mylink
</a>
4 <p> <%=escapeHtml(addr) %>
Fig. 1: Motivation Example
If the encoding function, escapeHtml(), were not applied,
the JavaScript function atk() on line 4 would be executed.
The encoding function escapeHtml() replaces the < and >
characters with &lt; and &gt; respectively and transforms the
malicious input into the following string, preventing atk()
from being interpreted as a JavaScript program by the browser:
&lt;script&gt; atk(); &lt;/script &gt;
However, the same encoding function does not work for
the case on line 3. A malicious input for pid might be the
following:
'+ atk() + '
It will pass escapeHtml() unchanged. The rendered anchor
element would be as follows:
<a onclick= "fn(''+ atk()+'')" href= "#"
> mylink </a>
JavaScript function atk() will be executed as part of evalu-
ating the input parameter expression of function fn() when the
link is clicked. The correct JavaScript encoder would, in this
case, replace the single quote character with escaped single
quote \’ to prevent this attack.
There are also cases where more than one encoding function
must be used (e.g. an untrusted input used in both JavaScript
and HTML contexts). The order of applying encoders is
sometimes important as well. For example, Fig.2 shows a
case in which the order of encoders is incorrect. The order is
incorrect because the JavaScript encoder on line 3 is intended
to prevent successful attacks by encoding single and double
quote characters as they can be used to shape successful
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21 <% user=
request.getParameter("user");
2 var1 = escapeHtmlDecimal(user);
3 var2 = escapeJavaScript(var1)+
"cnst"; %>
4 <a onclick="fn('<%= var2
%>');">Details</a>
Fig. 2: Incorrect Order Of Encoders
attacks for the onclick attribute on line 4. However, in this
case, the first encoder (escapeHtmlDecimal) replaces single
quote characters with &#39 and this character combination
will not be changed by the second encoder (escapeJavaScript).
Thus, the encoded string by the first encoder (&#39); attack();
// ) can pass through the second encoder and be sent to the
browser. Unfortunately, browsers will decode (&#39); attack();
// ) back to the original attack string (’); attack(); // ) leading to
a successful attack. This vulnerability can be fixed by reversing
the order of the encoders used.
Applying the correct encoding is thus context-sensitive,
meaning the encoder must match the web element context
where an untrusted variable occurs. In practice, a variable
can occur in one of the following four contexts: HTML-
body, JavaScript, CSS, and URL. Unfortunately, there is no
systematic way to detect vulnerabilities due to mismatch of
encoder and context [2]. Other researchers have looked at
vulnerability prevention mechanisms using type inference to
automatically detect the context of an untrusted variable so
the correct encoding function can be automatically applied. To
aid type inference, such efforts all rely on template languages
with stronger type systems, such as Closure Templates [4]
or HandleBars [5]. Such approaches have several limitations.
First many web applications do not use such template lan-
guages. Second, type inference is not fully successful even
with template languages. For example, a research team from
Yahoo! found that they could identify the correct context in
about 90.9% of applications written in HandleBars using type
inference to detect the correct context. Other researchers have
also shown that type inference is not always accurate for some
program constructs written in Closure Templates [4].
Detecting XSS vulnerabilities through black box testing has
also been researched, and there are several open source and
commercial implementations [6]–[9]. In these approaches, a
vulnerability is detected by inspecting web application outputs.
If an injected attack payload is found in the output, the
application is deemed vulnerable. However, this approach can
lead to high false positives as an attack payload may not be
executed by the browser. Black box testing could also have
high false negative rates as well, due to inadequate test path
coverage [6].
In this paper we present a unit testing based approach to
automatically detect and repair XSS vulnerabilities due to
incorrect encoding function usage. We have built a proof-of-
concept implementation for web applications written in Java
and JSP. This approach can be extended to other server-side
web programming languages as well (e.g. PHP and ASP).
To detect XSS vulnerabilities we use an architecture com-
posed of three components. First, to ensure XSS vulnerability
test coverage, we construct multiple unit tests based on one
given JSP file in the application. Second, we confirm each
vulnerability by rendering attacked pages using a headless
browser in a unit testing framework. Third, we have a struc-
tured way of generating attack strings as test inputs for unit
test. Finally, to automatically fix detected vulnerabilities, we
replace the vulnerable encoder(s) and re-evaluate using unit
testing.
There are several contributions of this work. We minimize
false positives by confirming vulnerabilities via execution in
a real browser. False positives are a major obstacle for wide
adoption of software security tools [6], [10]. Our testing ap-
proach can pinpoint exact locations of vulnerabilities, making
it easy for remediation. We also minimize false negatives by
ensuring path coverage for unit tests as well as systemati-
cally generating attack strings using BNF grammars based
on modeling how browsers interpret JavaScript programs.
Moreover, the proposed auto-fixing mechanism can fix many
XSS vulnerabilities and use unit testing to either accept or
reject the applied repairs.
In Section II we introduce an overall architecture of our
approach and its components for XSS vulnerability detection
and repair. We explain the unit test construction in Section
III. Section IV explains an attack evaluation technique based
on a unit testing framework followed by our grammar-based
attack generation technique in section V. The vulnerability
repair mechanism is introduced in section VI and section VII
shows our evaluation results for vulnerability detection and
repair. Section VIII reviews the related works followed by a
conclusion and discussion of future research in section IX.
II. ARCHITECTURE
The proposed approach combines static-dynamic vulnerabil-
ity detection technique based on unit testing Static analysis is
used to find the vulnerabilities have the advantage of complete
source code coverage but suffer from high rate of false positive
results due to ambiguities in determining whether a suspected
vulnerability can actually be exploited. Dynamic analysis
approaches can find the vulnerabilities with low rate of false
positives due to using the real results of source code execution
but suffer from the source code coverage issue leading to false
negatives. to reduce both false positive and false negative. I
use static analysis to maximizes code coverage to examine all
execution paths. I use dynamic analysis to verify all attack
inputs with a headless browser to minimize false positives.
Our approach is designed to be integrated into unit testing
frameworks such JUnit, so vulnerabilities can be mitigated
early in the software development life-cycle.
Following our previous work [11], the overall architecture of
our approach is shown in Fig.3. This figure lists the approach
inputs as: the source code under the test and configurations
including sensitive operations (security sinks) and untrusted
3Fig. 3: Overall Architecture of XSS Unit Testing
sources. The output of this approach is a list of vulnerable
points in the source code, many of them may be repaired by
the auto-fixing component.
Key components of XSS vulnerability detection include:
XSS unit test extraction from application source, unit tests
evaluation, and attack vector generation. I also proposed a
automatic-fixing technique to repair many detected vulnera-
bilities using encoder placement.
The Unit Test Construction component analyzes the source
code in order to automatically extract and generate unit tests
for XSS detection in such a way to ensure test coverage.
The Attack Evaluation component will use a repository of
attack scripts, generated using the proposed Attack Generation
component, to evaluate each unit test. Reported vulnerabilities
may be examined by the auto-fixing component to find repairs.
Throughout the paper I will use the following terminology
to explain our approach.
Security Sinks refer to program statements performing
operations that could be subject to XSS attacks. Specifically,
these server-side output generation commands sending values
of variables to browser such as out.print() or <%= %>
statements in JSP.
Untrusted Sources refer to statements retrieving informa-
tion from sources that may contain malicious data. For exam-
ple, request.getParameter() gets the data from the Internet. For
our research, I assume untrusted sources are given as a set of
API’s returning untrusted values.
Tainted Variables These are variables that obtain their
values (directly or indirectly) from the untrusted sources.
Encoders are functions that are used to generate safe
version of their inputs using character encoding mechanisms
such as escapeHtml(). Most developers use one of the widely
used libraries of encoders such as ESAPI.
Tainted Data Flow is data flow of the tainted variable from
an untrusted source to its destination in a security sink. I define
each data flow as a tuple of untrusted source (U), security sink
(S) and a list of encoders (E) between source and sink.
III. UNIT TEST CONSTRUCTION
To ensure test path coverage, we construct a set of unit tests
automatically based on each JSP file with the goal that if the
original JSP file has an XSS vulnerability due to incorrect
encoder usage, at least one of the constructed unit tests will
be similarly vulnerable as well. We refer to the JSP file in the
application as the original unit test and each unit test JSP file
generated as the XSS unit test. The following are inputs for
XSS unit test construction: (1) source code and (2) untrusted
sources and (3) sinks.
We illustrate unit test generation using Fig.4 as the original
code and Fig.5 as one of the constructed XSS unit tests.
To focus our discussions, we assume the application en-
codes all untrusted variables using known encoding functions.
Taint analysis can readily discover execution paths where an
untrusted variable appears in a sink without encoding. Our
vulnerability model is a situation where an encoder does not
match the application’s HTML document context.
1 <% ord
=request.getParameter("order");
2 ord = escapeHtml(ord);
3 if(editMode){ %>
4 <a onclick="edit('<%= ord %>')"
href="#" > Edit Order </a>
5 <% } else { %>
6 <p> Order:<%= ord %> </p> <% } %>
Fig. 4: Original Source Code
Java variables and statements in a JSP file are referred to
as host variables and statements. The term HTML document
context refers to HTML and JavaScript code in the JSP file. To
avoid false negatives, we test all sinks in all possible HTML
document contexts. For convenience of performing program
analysis, we replace all HTML elements with equivalent Java
statements. This task is accomplished by using a JSP code
analyzer that uses Java output generation commands such as
out.write() to enclose HTML and JavaScript parts of the JSP
files. For example, HTML elements on line 4 of Fig.4 are
replaced by lines 5-7 in Fig.5.
Java branch statements could impact a sink’s HTML doc-
ument context as illustrated by Fig.4. Untrusted variable ord
is in a JavaScript context in the "then" branch of a Java if-
statement (line 4). In the "else" branch of the same Java if-
statement, variable ord is in an HTML body context (line 6).
To ensure we test sinks in all possible HTML contexts we test
each of the Java if-statement branches in a separate unit test
JSP file. Our intuition is that for most web pages, this will
not lead to a large combinatorial explosion of test cases (see
more in the evaluation section).
A control flow analysis is performed to generate control
flow graphs for each JSP file. Multiple XSS unit tests will
be created when the JSP file contains if or switch/case Java
41 String ord =
request.getParameter("order");
2 ord= escapeHtml(ord);
3 //"then" branch of if statemenet
4 boolean e1= (editMode);
5 out.write("<a onclick=\"edit(' ");
6 out.write(ord);
7 out.write(" ')\" href=\"#\" > Edit
Order</a>");
Fig. 5: Generated Unit Test
statements. For example, the source code of Fig.4 contains the
following two possible execution paths:
• Line numbers 1,2,3,4 (then branch)
• Line numbers 1,2,3,6 (else branch)
Two XSS unit tests are generated for this example, each
corresponds to one execution path containing no branching
logic and each has a sink containing one untrusted variable.
Execution paths without sinks or untrusted variables are dis-
carded as they are not vulnerable to XSS attacks.
Fig.5 is a XSS unit test extracted from the "then-branch"
of the Java if-statement in Fig.4. The untrusted variable in
this unit test is ord, which appears in a sink statement (<%=
%>). The sanitizing function is on line 2. To avoid any runtime
exceptions or miss any statements affecting the HTML context
we keep the conditional expression used in the if-statement
in both branches, which is shown as on line 4 of Fig.5, by
assigning the value of the conditional expression (editMode)
to a Boolean variable e1.
While it is possible for branch statements written in
JavaScript to change the HTML document context of a sink,
we expect such cases to be rare. This is because sinks are
written in Java. It is therefore natural for developers to use
Java to express changes in HTML document context. We
thus assume that JavaScript code does not change the HTML
document context of sinks. We will assess this and other
assumptions in the evaluation section.
We assume that each JSP web page is set up for unit testing.
This means we have a runtime environment with web server,
application server, and database server. Running XSS unit
tests do not have additional requirements. The original JSP
page is launched on a web server to set up the session. A
proxy captures the session information. The captured session
is sent as part of subsequent requests for XSS unit testing. The
process described above is standard practice for unit testing
web pages.
Single Variable. In the ideal case, the original JSP file
contains one untrusted variable as is the case in Fig.4. For
such a case, there are no false negatives because all possible
HTML document contexts are captured by at least one XSS
unit test. If the original code was vulnerable due to using the
wrong encoding function, then at least one of the XSS unit
tests would be vulnerable as well.
1 <% List<Profile> prf;
2 prf= searchProfile(customerID);
3 fName = escapeHtml(prf.Name); %>
4 <a onclick="profile('<%= fName %>
')" href="#" >
Fig. 6: Code with Untrusted Source from a Database call
1 //param is an input parameter
containing an attack string at test
time
2 param =
request.getParameter("param");
3 prf= searchProfile(customerID);
4 // Injection point is in place of
prf.Name in original code
5 fName = escapeHtml(param);
6 out.write("<a onclick=\"profile(\'");
7 // sink line in original code = 4
8 out.write( addLine(fName , "4") );
9 out.write(" ')\" href='#' >");
Fig. 7: Generated Unit Test with Injection Point
We define a false positive as a situation where the applica-
tion’s context and the applied encoding function are matched
(safe) in the original source code, but the encoding function is
detected as vulnerable (mismatched) by an XSS unit test. This
is not possible for the ideal case because our XSS unit test
construction process preserves the HTML document contexts
of the original JSP file.
Injection points for XSS unit tests. We assume that
untrusted sources are specified as a set of Java API’s, such as
user forms and database queries. Taint flow analysis is used to
identify injection points in the program. Injection points are
places where variables containing an attack string (as an input
parameter for the unit test) are injected into a unit test. These
variables are used as an argument of the first encoder function
in its data-flow from untrusted source to security sinks. Since
an XSS unit test contains no branching logic, detection of
such injection points is straightforward. Fig.6 shows part of
an original source code. Untrusted variable fName is used in
a sink on line 4 after being sanitized using encoder on line
3. Variable fName gets value from variable prf as result of
a database call, searchProfile(), a tainted source on line 2. In
the corresponding unit test in Fig.7, variable containing the
attack string param will be injected into the XSS unit test as
the input parameter of the escapeHtml() encoder, as its first
application in an statement, on line 3 of Fig.6.
We also instrument each XSS unit test so that it reports
the line number in the source code if a vulnerability
51 <%= "User : " + escapeHtml(user) +
"(" + escapeHtml(email) + ")" %>
2 <%= escapeHtml( "Patient:" +
firstName + " " + lastName) %>
Fig. 8: Multiple Tainted Variables in one Sink
1 <div> <%= escapeHtml(request.getPara c
meter("atk"))%>
</div>
2 Attack String : + alert(1)
3 <div> + alert(1) </div>
Fig. 9: False Positive in Attack Detection
is found as shown on line 8 of Fig.7. We identify the
line number of each sink statement in the original JSP file.
Suppose the line number of a sink in the original JSP file is 4:
4: <%= tainted + "constant" %>
We add a function to each unit test to add the line number
of the sink statement to the attack string:
out.write(addLine(tainted + "constant",4)))
Function addLine() is a server-side function which adds
the line number of the sink statement as a parameter to the
attack payload. This line number is calculated during the static
analysis process generating XSS unit tests. In our evaluation
described below, this line number will be used to identify
the vulnerable statement line number to the developer and
also used to guide the auto-fixing component to replace the
incorrect encoders .
Multiple Variables: An XSS unit test may contain multiple
untrusted variables. Fig.8 shows two examples. Best secure
programing practices [12] suggest that if both variables are
properly sanitized with respect to the expected HTML docu-
ment context, their combination should be safe as well. We
refer to this as the independent encoding assumption.
This assumption allows us to test one variable at a time
by holding the rest of the untrusted variables constant. We
will evaluate the assumption of encoding independence in the
evaluation section.
IV. ATTACK EVALUATION
The goal of attack evaluation is to assess whether an XSS
unit test is vulnerable to any of the XSS attack strings. One
widely used attack evaluation approach, exemplified by the
popular black box testing tools such as NoScript [13], XS-
SAuditor [14] and ZAP [9], is String Matching Assessment
which aims to look up the attack payload in the response page.
The rationale for this approach is that if an attack payload
1 Public void prepare() {
2 wt = new WebTester();
3 sessionPreparation();
4 //other preparations such as proxy
5 }
6 public void run() {
7 for( String atk :atkVectors){
8 // Invoking the Unit Test
9 wt.gotoPage("unit1.jsp?param="+atk);
10 sleep(100);
11 verifyResponse(wt);
12 } }
Fig. 10: Test Driver with Test Preparation
1 var tags = document.all;
2 for (var i=0; i <tags.length;i++){
3 e= tags[i];
4 //finding events that has body
5 if (typeof e.onfocus == "function")
{
6 event = e.onfocus;
7 e.onclick=event;
8 e.click(); }
9 // checking for other events of tag e
10 }
Fig. 11: Triggering all events having a handler
can bypass encoder functions intact, an attack could occur.
Unfortunately this approach can lead to high false positives. A
successful attack payload must be compatible with the context
it is injected into. For instance, Fig.9 shows a situation in
which an HTML body encoder is used to sanitize a user-
entered parameter on line 1. Line 2 is an attack string from
ZAP’s attack repository. Line 3 shows a part of the output
of the web page when this attack string is applied. Since the
encoder does not alter the attack string, ZAP reports this page
as vulnerable. This is a false positive because this attack cannot
be executed in the HTML context.
Another approach known as DOM Structure Assessment
is based on the observation that a successful attack can change
the Document Object Model(DOM) structure of the response
page. Assessing of this effect, known as lexical confinement,
can be done by comparing the DOM structure of the response
page using taint-aware policies written as taint tree patterns
[15], [16]. Taint tree patterns are trees with regular expressions
in their nodes describing different cases a successful attack
can change the parse tree of an injected HTML node. This
approach needs to define all possible taint tree patterns which
6can be very difficult especially for JavaScript codes, and leads
to false negatives.
A. Attack payload evaluation
Our approach is to execute unit tests by a headless browser
such as JWebUnit. Vulnerabilities are only reported if suc-
cessful execution of an attack payload by JWebUnit is de-
tected [11]. For attack payload, we use a JavaScript function
attack(line), which takes as parameter the line number of the
sink statement in the original source code being tested. The
line number of each security sink is generated during the
static analysis of the unit test construction as mentioned in
the previous section. Function attack() changes the web page
title by appending that line number. Web page title changes are
monitored to detect successful attacks along with the location
of the vulnerability in the source code.
B. Test Driver
Fig.10 shows the XSS unit test driver. Lines 2 and 3
are for test preparation. Function sessionPreparation() sets
up the execution environment by applying captured session
information. The rest of the test driver invokes the XSS unit
test by applying attack strings. After initializing an instance of
WebTester (a subclass of JWebUnit) on line 2, each iteration
of the loop on line 7 takes one attack vector (atk) and invokes
the XSS unit test page (unit1.jsp) with the attack string as
a parameter (line 9). Line 10 pauses to let the unit test page
be rendered completely. Line 11 asserts whether the attack is
successful by checking the title of the response page. If the
attack is successful, the page title contains line number(s) of
the vulnerable sinks, helping developers to fix vulnerabilities.
C. Handling events
Attacks can be injected into vulnerable elements of HTML
tags that are only executed upon triggering events, such as
on key down. In order to find such vulnerabilities, we must
trigger each event in the XSS unit test. There are 88 possible
events in HTML5, some of them can only be triggered based
on particular user interaction such as onmouseover or a run
time condition such as onerror.
However, since all events share the same syntax, we can
substitute events that cannot be easily simulated in a test
environment with an event that can be easily triggered. We
verified that in major browsers (Chrome, Safari, Firefox) event
onclick can be associated with every HTML tag and it can be
triggered using a JavaScript API. Fig.11 shows a JavaScript
program we use to go through all tags in the DOM. For each
tag, the program checks if the tag has an event with an event
body (line 5). If a tag has a body, the program assigns the
event body to an onclick event and triggers it automatically.
V. ATTACK GENERATION
Because our test evaluation is based on execution of attack
strings, we must make sure attack strings are syntactically
correct. Furthermore, we want to include all possible types
of attack scenarios. Related works in generating XSS attacks
rely on either expert input [17], or on reported attacks [8],
[18]. It is difficult to show that all possible attack scenarios
are included using these approaches.
Our approach consists of two components. First we use
context free grammar rules to model how JavaScript payloads
are interpreted by a typical browser. Assuming they are
accurate, then a successful attack must follow these grammar
rules. Second, we devise an algorithm to derive attack strings
systematically based on these grammar rules. Assuming the
grammar rules accurately model the way the browser interprets
JavaScript programs, and assuming that the attack derivation
algorithm can generate at least one attack string for every
type of attack, then our approach would cover all possible
attack scenarios. It is possible that either we may have missed
some grammar rules by which a browser interprets JavaScript
programs, or the attack enumeration algorithm failed to con-
sider a possible derivation path. Through peer review, we can
improve both components in a way similar to any security
algorithms are revised. The advantage of this approach is
we rely expert know-how on the more manageable task of
modeling browser behavior as opposed to the more open-ended
task of enumerating possible attack scenarios.
A. Browser Modeling
A typical web browser contains multiple interpreters:
HTML, CSS, URI and JavaScript. The browser behavior can
be modeled as one interpreter passing control to another
upon parsing specific input tokens while rendering HTML
documents. We refer to the event of interpreter switching as
context switching. For example, the URI parser transfers the
control to the JavaScript parser if it detects input javascript:
as in the case:
<img src="javascript:attack();" >
A successful XSS attack is to induce the JavaScript inter-
preter to execute an attack payload. We use a set of context
free grammar (CFG) rules to specify possible input strings
that cause the browser to activate the JavaScript interpreter
to execute an attack payload. Portners et. al. [19] observed
that a successful XSS attack must either call a JavaScript
function (e.g. an API), or make an assignment (e.g. change
the DOM). According to JavaScript language syntax, wherever
an assignment operation can be executed, a function call can
also be made. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume
the attack payload (referred to as PAYLOAD in the following
grammars) is a function attack() that changes the title of the
web page.
Like Halfond et. al [20], we divide the CFG into these
sections: URI, CSS, HTML, Event and JavaScript. In each
section we specify possible transitions to cause a JavaScript
interpreter to execute an attack payload. We will then integrate
these sections of grammar rules to generate attack strings.
For clarity, we will use the following convention in grammar
definitions: upper case words for non-terminals, lower case
words for terminals, symbols sq, dq, eq for single quote,
double quote and equal sign characters respectively.
7URIATRIB ::= URIHOST eq URIVAL
URIHOST ::= src | href | codebase | cite|action | back-
ground | data | classid | longdesc|profile |usemap | forma-
ction|icon | manifest | poster | srcset | archive
URIVAL ::= sq URI sq | dq URI dq | URI
URI ::= javascript: PAYLOAD
Fig. 12: URI Grammar
1) URI context: URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) strings
identify locations of resources such images or script files.
Based on RFC 3986, they have the following generic syntax:
scheme: [//[user:password@] host [:port]][/] path [?query]
[#fragment]
Here, the scheme represents protocol type (such as ftp
or http) used to access a resource, and the rest of the
string expresses the authority and path information required to
identify the resource. To cause the URI interpreter to switch
to the JavaScript interpreter, the scheme must be equal to
the keyword javascript, followed by JavaScript statements.
Other possible schemes include http, ftp, and https. Since no
JavaScript can be injected into schemes other than scheme
javascript, we concentrate on describing URIs that contains the
JavaScript scheme [21]. An URI can be properly interpreted
by a browser only as a value of an expected attribute of a host
context. We continue with the example of
<img src="javascript:attack();">
where src is the source attribute of the HTML img tag and
referred to as URIHOST. Fig.12 represents the grammar for
URI. Rule URIATRIB specifies a URI attribute consisting
of a URIHOST name and the URLVAL. Rule URIHOST
lists all possible URI host contexts in an HTML document.
Again, for the purpose of generating attack strings, we only
consider a URI of the JavaScript scheme. PAYLOAD is a
special nonterminal representing a JavaScript attack payload.
It signals to the attack generator that a context switch to
JavaScript is possible at this point.
2) CSS Context: Cascading Style Sheets (CSS)
specifications can be either contained in a CSS file or
placed directly in HTML elements, e.g. tag definitions (using
the style attribute or style blocks). A context switch from the
CSS interpreter to the JavaScript interpreter is possible only
when a URI is a property of a CSS-style element, specified
by function url(). The argument to the url() function must
follow the definition of URI in Fig.12. Fig.13 lists rules for
URI to be included as part of a CSS-style element.
3) Attribute Event Context: HTML events, such as
onfocus and onload, can cause context switches to JavaScript.
Grammar rules in Fig.14 define an HTML event attribute
composed of an event name EVENTNAME and value
EVENTVAL. Although types of possible events vary with
HTML tags, we found that the onclick event can be triggered
in all HTML tags. As mentioned in attack evaluation section,
STYLEATRIB ::= style eq STYLEVAL
STYLEVAL ::= (sq STYLE sq) | (dq STYLE dq) |
(STYLE)
STYLE ::= CSSPROP*
CSSPROP ::= PROPNAME : PROPVAL;
PROPNAME ::= background-image | list- style-image|
content | cursor | cue-after | cue-before
PROPVAL ::= url(URI)
Fig. 13: CSS Grammar
EVENTATRIB ::= EVENTNAME eq EVENTVAL
EVENTNAME ::= onclick
EVENTVAL ::= sq PAYLOAD sq | dq PAYLOAD dq |
PAYLOAD
Fig. 14: Event Attributes Grammar
HTML ::= ELEM*
ELEM ::= IMG | STYLE | SCRIPT | SPECIAL
IMG ::= <img ATRIBLIST >
ATRIBLIST ::= ATTRIBUTE*
ATTRIBUTE ::= URIATRIB | STYLEATRIB | EVEN-
TATRIB
STYLE ::= <style> CSSPROP* </style>
SCRIPT ::= <script> PAYLOAD </script>
SPECIAL ::= ( </textarea> | </title> )
Fig. 15: Integration Grammar
we change all events in the source code to the onclick event
for attack evaluation. Rule EVENTVAL defines the value of
the event which is a JavaScript statement to be executed upon
the specified event.
4) HTML: Having modeled context switches in URI, CSS,
and Event, we integrate them in a single grammar to model
JavaScript execution in HTML as shown in Fig.15. A XSS
attack script can be injected either in a tag’s attribute or tag’s
body. Rule HTML in Fig.15 defines tags as a set of elements
represented by the ELEM rule to cover these cases.
Since all HTML tags attributes share identical syntax,
we use rule IMG to define tag img as a representative to
model all possible context switching patterns via tag attributes.
The browser can switch to the JavaScript interpreter only in
the following tag attribute types: URI, CSS, and EVENT.
Grammar rules for these elements have been discussed above.
In the case of injection into tag bodies, JavaScript must be
enclosed by the <script> </script> tags, as specified by the
SCRIP rule. However, there are a few exceptions. First, inside
<style> tag body, JavaScript can only be included as part of
some CSS properties, as specified by STYLE rule. Second,
no JavaScript are allowed in bodies of <textarea> and <title>
tags. To inject JavaScript into bodies of these tags, these tags
must first be closed as specified by rule SPECIAL.
8ADDITIVEXP ::= PRIMARYEXP ADDITIVEPART
ADDITIVEPART::= (+ PRIMARYEXP)*
PRIMARYEXP ::= PAYLOAD | LITERAL
LITERAL = dq 1 dq | sq 1 sq | 1
Fig. 16: JavaScript Additive Expressions Grammar
5) JavaScript: JavaScript code can be placed either directly
in HTML elements (e.g. through tag events such as onclick) or
in <script> blocks. Attackers can inject a malicious payload
into a block of vulnerable JavaScript code. A successful attack
must manipulate the JavaScript interpreter into executing the
payload, attack().
Injection points in JavaScript are (Java) host variables.
While host variables could be used in any JavaScript con-
struct, such as part of a variable or function name (
e.g., var vname<%= hostVar %> = 'value';) such cases
make little sense. Host variables are primarily used to pass
server-side values to JavaScript code. Thus we only consider
scenarios where attack scripts are injected as part of a string or
a numeric literal in expressions as illustrated by the following
examples in a JavaScript block.
1 var x = " const <%= hostVar %> " ;
2 var x = 19<%= hostVar %>;
3 var x = 20 * <%= hostVar %>;
4 func("const" + <%= hostVar %> ,
param2);
5 if ( <%= hostVar %> == 2017) {...}
The goal of the each attack script is to turn the host variable
into an expression so a function call can be made. A successful
attack can be any syntactically correct JavaScript expression.
Without loss of generality, we generate attack expressions
using only the plus(+) operator as it can be used on both string
and numeric data. The resulting expression is referred to as
an additive expression. Its grammar is shown in Fig.16. The
first two lines in Fig.16 define JavaScript additive expressions
as expressions composed of multiple string/numeric literals or
expressions concatenated to each other using the plus(+) op-
erator in JavaScript. PAYLOAD non-terminal is a placeholder
for attack payloads.
B. Attack String Generation
The goal of the attack string generation is to generate all
possible types of attacks using the grammar rules described
in the previous section. We describe the generation process in
this section.
1) Sentence Derivation: We generate XSS attack strings
based on any of the grammars described above by constructing
a leftmost derivation tree [22] from the start symbol of each
grammar. The following are derivation steps for a sentence
based on the HTML img tag grammar.
ELEM ::= IMG
::= <img ATTRIBUTE*>
::= <img EVENTATRIB >
::= <img EVENTNAME eq EVENTVAL >
::= <img onclick = PAYLOAD >
2) Generating Attack Strings: Attacks can be injected in
any part of an HTML element, a CSS block, or JavaScript
expression. Consider the following example where a host
variable, hostVar, is a function parameter on the right hand
side of the assignment statement for variable fName.
var fName =func("Dr. <%= hostVar %> ");
The attack script must take into consideration existing
characters both to the left and to the right of the injection
point (point in which the hostVar is placed), referred to as
left context and right context respectively as described in our
previous work [11].
To fit the attack into the left context, one may close the
string parameter with character ” followed by a context switch
using a new additive expression. The resulting attack string
would be: " + attack() + " and the successful injection is
shown as follows:
var fName =func("Dr." + attack() + "");
We first derive a sentence based on the start symbol of the
grammar. Each sentence will lead to successful execution of
a JavaScript attack. To systematically generate attacks for all
possible existing left and right contexts, we must produce
all possible partial sentences. The following is a possible
derivation for an additive expression in JavaScript leading to
a complete sentence:
ADDITIVEXP ::= PRIMARYTEXP ADDITIVEPART
. . . ::= LITERAL ADDITIVEPART
. . . ::= "1" ADDITIVEPART
. . . ::= "1" (+ PRIMARYTEXP)*
. . . ::= "1" + PRIMARYTEXP + PRIMARYTEXP
. . . ::= "1" + PAYLOAD + "1"
For each complete sentence derived from the grammar,
we generate multiple versions of partial sentence as potential
attack strings. Each version will be shaped by removing one
token from the either the beginning or from the end of
the previous version starting from the initial sentence. These
versions represent different possible ways an attack can be
successfully interpreted by the browser taking advantage of
the injection point’s left and right contexts.
This removing process will continue until the first
PAYLOAD symbol is reached. For example, given the
additive expression derived earlier, the following versions of
attack strings can be generated.
1) "1" + PAYLOAD + "1"
2) 1" + PAYLOAD + "1"
3) " + PAYLOAD + "1"
4) + PAYLOAD + "1"
95) PAYLOAD + "1"
To consider existing contexts to the right of the injection
point, we systematically generate multiple versions of any
partial attack string by removing one token from the end of
the previous one until the PAYLOAD symbol is reached. The
following four versions of attack strings are derived based on
attack string 3 from previous list:
6) "+PAYLOAD + "1
7) "+PAYLOAD + "
8) "+PAYLOAD +
9) "+PAYLOAD
Attack string in item 7 can be successfully injected into host
variable hostVar.
3) Closures: Closure operators (*, +) in our grammar rules
may result in an infinite number of derivations. The following
example shows a derivation by applying the closure operator
up to two times on the ELEM rule. A total of six derivations
are possible for the ELEM non-terminal:
HTML ::= ELEM*
ELEM ::= (IMG | SCRIPT)*
::= IMG
::= IMG IMG
::= IMG SCRIPT
::= SCRIPT
::= SCRIPT SCRIPT
::= SCRIPT IMG
We observed that attack strings containing more than one
attack payload are redundant. This is because a successful
attack only needs to execute one payload. If an attack pattern
is not successful, repeating the same pattern multiple times
will not help it succeed. We empirically determine the number
of times closure operators need to be applied. We compute
leftmost derivations by applying different upper bounds on
closure operators until no more attack strings with one payload
can be added. For example, for the grammar rules presented
here, applying each closure operator 3 times does not generate
new attack strings with one payload over applying each closure
operator 2 times. Note that current grammars do not contain
recursive rules.
In summary we generate a set of attack strings by deriving
sentences from the start symbol of each grammar (URI, CSS,
HTML, EVENT, JavaScript). Each closure operation is applied
up to two times. For each attack string in the initial set, we
generate additional versions of the attack string by dropping
tokens from both the left and right as described above. Only
attack strings with a single context-switch are included in the
final set of attack strings for unit testing.
VI. AUTOMATIC REPAIR
After detecting vulnerabilities, the repair phase aims to
automatically fix discovered vulnerabilities by replacing the
1 <% String user =
request.getParameter("username");
2 user = escapeHtml(user); %>
3 User Name: <div ><%= user %> </div>
4 <img src="plus.gif"
onclick="details('<%= user %>')" >
Fig. 17: Original Source Code
1 1) <% String param = JavaScriptEnco c
der(request.getParameter("param"));%>
2 <script> Func( 9<%= param %>);
</script>
3 // Attack Script : + attack();
4 2) <script> window.setInterval('<%=
param %>');</script>
5 // Successful Attack Script:
attack();
Fig. 18: Proper Encoders but Vulnerable
incorrect encoders with proper ones. Consider the sample code
snippet of Fig.17, security unit testing will reveal an XSS
vulnerability on line 4 as the HTML encoder used on line
2 will not prevent XSS attacks in the JavaScript context. The
following is an example of a successful attack against this
vulnerability :
’); attack(); //
We observed that there are four choices of contexts of base
encoders: HTML, JavaScript, URL and CSS. One must also
consider combinations of multiple encoders. As we discussed
in the introduction, a wrong order of encoders can also lead to
vulnerabilities [23]. The OWASP secure programming guide-
line [24], a highly regarded source for secure programming,
suggests the following six possible encoders and their com-
binations: HTMLEncoder, JavaScriptEncoder , CSSEncoder,
URLEncoder , JavaScript(HTML()) and JavaScript(URL()) as
adequate for preventing the vast majority of XSS vulnerabili-
ties. We refer to this list of six choices as candidate encoders.
We explore the possibility of automatically fixing XSS vul-
nerabilities by trying each of the possible candidate encoders
to replace vulnerable encoders and use the attack evaluation
mechanism described in section IV to verify if the replacement
produces a program not susceptible to XSS attacks. This
repair strategy is computationally feasible for most program
structures due to the limited number of candidate encoders (6
encoders) and the short time required to verify each encoder
replacement. However, there are a few caveats to the auto
fixing approach.
First, we may be able to fix a vulnerability but un-
intentionally lead to unexpected behavior. For example, a
JavaScript(Html()) encoding sequence may be applied to
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Fig. 19: Different Cases of the Automatic Repair: (a) Single Variable, Single/Multiple Encoders. (b) Multiple Variables (c)
Multiple Variables -Single Sink (d,e) Multiple Sinks - Shared Encoder. (f) Multiple Unit Tests
encode a variable (e.g., companyName) inside a JavaScript
block. If the value of companyName happens to be safe
value of Johnson & Johnson, what would be displayed to the
end user could be Johnson &mp; Johnson. We refer to this
problem as over-encoding. It is very difficult to avoid over
encoding as there is no precise definition. We can minimize
the likelihood of over-encoding by considering encoders in the
candidate encoder list. Furthermore, we choose repairs with
single encoder over repairs that involve double-encoder.
Second, popular encoding libraries such as Apache, Spring
framework, and ESAPI, differ in implementation details that
can cause vulnerabilities, as illustrated on lines 1 and 2 of
Fig.18. On line 1, a JavaScript encoder should be used to
sanitize variable param. Both Apache and Spring libraries did
not prevent the attack string listed on line 3, but the JavaScript
encoder from ESAPI library is safe. The reason is that ESAPI
encodes character plus(+) while the the other two leave it
unchanged.
Third, it is possible that no fix can be found by using one of
the candidate encoders. In such cases, we will defer the fix to
developers. For example, we cannot fix unsafe programming
practices outlined by OWASP, as illustrated on lines 2 and
4 of Fig.18. JavaScript API setInterval() is inherently unsafe
because it may take attack() directly as an argument. No
encoders can fix this vulnerability. We do not consider repairs
that require structural changes to the program, like adding a
new variable, add or deleting statements.
Finally, we only vulnerable code where up to two encoders
are used in a sequence, which should cover the vast majority
of cases [25] Vulnerabilities with more than two encoders in a
1 <% user=
request.getParameter("user");
2 user= escapeHtml(user); %>
3 <a onclick="fn('<%= user
%>');">Details</a>
Fig. 20: Single Variable, Single Encoder
1 <% user=
request.getParameter("user");
2 user = escapeHtmlDecimal(user);
3 user2 = escapeJavaScript(user)+
"constant"; %>
4 <a onclick="fn('<%= user2 %>');">
More Details</a>
Fig. 21: Single Variable, Multiple Encoder
sequence are referred to the developer as auto-fixing is likely
to lead to over encoding.
The core task for repair is to replace the vulnerable encoder
and perform XSS unit testing to either accept or reject the fix.
Fig.19 shows all possible scenarios for encoder replacement.
We examine each scenario in detail.
Single Variable: In this case a tainted data-flow only
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1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user = escapeHtml(user); %>
3 <a onclick=" details('<%= user %>
');" > Details </a>
4 <%
email=request.getParameter("email");
5 email = escapeHtml(email); %>
6 <a onclick=" fn(' <%= email %> '); "
> Send </a>
Fig. 22: Multiple independent tainted variables
contains one tainted variable and the tainted variable contains
up to two encoders in its path from the untrusted origin to
the sink as shown in Fig.19(a). Fig.20 shows a sample code
snippet for this case in which the tainted variable user has been
used in a sink on line 3 after being sanitized using encoder
escapeHtml() on line 2.
Repairing this vulnerability entails replacing the vulnera-
ble encoder (escapeHtml) on line 2 with another one from
the list of candidate encoders. After modifying the code
with each of the candidate encoders the modified code
should be tested again. In this example, encoder (escape-
JavaScript(escapeHtml)) would fix the vulnerability. The com-
putational complexity of this case is the time required to test
all the candidate encoders.
Fig.21 shows an example where an untrusted variable is
sanitized by two encoders on lines 2 and 3 before sending its
value to the browser via the sink statement of line 4. This
code is vulnerable because of order of encoders. Encoder
escapeHtmlDecimal() on line 2 replaces the single quote
character with its decimal equivalent which can bypass the
JavaScript encoder and be sent to the browser unchanged.
Once decimal encoded characters are parsed by the browser
they will be decoded back to original single code leading to
a successful attack as mentioned in introduction section.
To find a solution for this two-encoder case, we test the
following combinations from the candidate list where e1 and
e2 refer to encoders on lines 2 and 3 respectively.
• { e1: escapeJavaScript , e2: escapeHtml }
• { e1: escapeJavaScript , e2: escapeURL }
This single-variable case also covers situations in which
two encoders are nested in one statement such as the code
below:
user = escapeJavaScript( escapeHtml(user));
The single-variable case can be generalized to situations
where a unit test contains multiple independent data-flows as
shown in Fig.19(b). Fig.22 shows a unit test that contains
two tainted variables (user and email), they are used in
independent different sinks (line 3 , 6) with separate encoders
on lines 2 and 5. In this example, both encoders are incorrect.
Our approach can automatically fix these vulnerabilities by
1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user = escapeHtml(user);
3 email =
request.getParameter("email");
4 email = escapeHtml(email);
5 fullusr = user+"(" + email +")"; %>
6 <a onclick=" fn('<%= fullusr %>'); "
> Details </a>
Fig. 23: Multiple Variable - Single Sink
replacing both encoders as escapeJavaScript(). Because the
vulnerable sinks have independent data-flows they can be
evaluated at the same time. The computational complexity
for cases in Fig.19(a) and (b) are the same.
Multiple Variables - Single Sink: In this scenario one se-
curity sink is the end point of multiple untrusted variables with
separate encoders in their data-flows as shown in Fig.19(c).
A vulnerability is reported if at least one of the encoders
is incorrect. Fig.23 shows such a case in which two tainted
variables user and email are concatenated to shape the third
variable fulluser to be used in the sink on line 6 after user
is sanitized on line 2 (refereed as e1) and email on line 4
(refereed to as e2).
We observe that in most cases, variables in a given sink
appear in the same web application context. This implies
all variables should use same encoders. In the example of
Fig.23, because variables user and email appear in the same
context (i.e. JavaScript argument in an event), considering the
following replacements are sufficient.
1) { e1: escapeJavaScript , e2: escapeJavaScript }
2) { e1: escapeHtml, e2: escapeHtml }
3) { e1: escapeCSS, e2: escapeCSS }
4) { e1: escapeURI, e2: escapeURI }
5) { e1: escapeJavaScript (escapeHtml()) , e2: escape-
JavaScript (escapeHtml()) }
6) { e1: escapeJavaScript (escapeURI()) , e2: escape-
JavaScript (escapeURI()) }
However, one could imagine rare cases where multiple
variables in one sink may be rendered in two or more contexts.
For such cases, we must consider testing replacements where
e1 and e2 are different, or 6*6=36 encoder combinations.
This would be computationally expensive if many variables
are involved. We believe such cases are rare. So our proposal
is to only test the same encoder sequence for all variables at
the same time. If a repair cannot be found, this may indicate
multiple contexts are involved for the same sink. We defer
repair for such vulnerabilities to developers.
Multiple Sinks - Shared Encoder: These are cases where
different sinks share the same set of encoders as shown in
Fig.19(d) and (e). A vulnerability appears when a sink’s
context does not match the shared encoder. Fig.24 shows
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1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user =escapeHtml(user); %>
3 <a onclick= " Add( ' <%= user %> ' )
" > Add </a>
4 <a onclick= " Edit( ' <%= user %> '
) " > Edit </a>
Fig. 24: Multiple Sinks-Shared Encoder
1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user =escapeJavaScript(user); %>
3 <p> <%= user %> </p>
4 user =escapeHtml(user);
5 <a onclick= " Add( ' <%= user %> ' )
" > Edit </a>
Fig. 25: Shared Encoder: Different Contexts with solution
such a case in which the sinks on lines 3 and 4 use the same
encoder of line 2. To fix this vulnerability, the encoder on
line 2 need to be replaced by
user=escapeJavaScript(escapeHtml(user))
Moreover, a developer may add an extra encoder before
one of the sinks as line 4 of Fig.25. The more general pattern
for this case of multiple sinks sharing common encoders
is shown in Fig.19(e). This code is vulnerable because the
encoder on line 2 does not prevent attacks to line 3. Using the
list of candidate encoders, the repair found for the encoders
on lines 2 and 4 would be:
Line 2: user = escapeHtml(user)
Line 4: user = escapeJavaScript(user)
However, there are situations where no repair can be made
for this pattern of code. Consider the example in Fig.26
where encoded variable user is used in two different contexts:
JavaScript on lines 3 and HTML on line 5. The code is
vulnerable and a repair cannot be found for encoders on lines
2 and 4. The reason is that none of the OWASP two-encoder
combinations ( { Line 2: HTML , line 4: JavaScript} or { Line
2: URL , Line 4: JavaScript} will lead to safe code.
To repair this vulnerability, a new variable will have to be
created, changing the structure of the program. Our current
approach does not consider such moves. Future research is
needed to thoroughly explore this strategy.
Multiple XSS Unit Tests: So far we have considered
possible scenarios to repair a vulnerability within a single
1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user =escapeJavaScript(user); %>
3 <a onclick= " Add( ' <%= user %> ' )
" > Add </a>
4 user =escapeHtml(user);
5 <p> <%= user %> </p>
Fig. 26: Shared Encoder: Different Contexts and no solution
1 <% user =
request.getParameter("user");
2 user =escapeHtml(user)
3 if(editMode){ %>
4 <a onclick="fn('<%= user %>')" >
Edit User </a>
5 <% } else { %>
6 <div> User Name : <%= user %> </div>
<% } %>
Fig. 27: Share encoder in multiple unit tests
XSS unit test through encoder replacement. We consider next
situations where vulnerabilities are discovered in two different
XSS unit tests derived from the same JSP page as illustrated
in Fig.19(f). As long as fixes for each XSS unit recommend
same replacements , the final fix for the JSP page can be
easily constructed. An example of such a case is illustrated in
Fig.27. In this case, each XSS unit test is based on a different
branch of if/else statements. Lines 1,2,3,4 are in one XSS
unit test and lines 1,2,3,6 are in another one. Line 2 contains
the shared encoder between the two unit tests. Similar to the
shared encoder in Fig.25, the correct encoder on line 2 should
satisfy two contexts, as in:
cmp = escapeJavaScript( escapeHtml(cmp))
However, it is possible that there is a conflict in repairs for
each XSS unit test. In such a situation structural changes to
the code is required by a developer to fix this vulnerability.
VII. EVALUATIONS
Our evaluations use iTrust, an open source medical records
application with 112,000 lines of Java/JSP code [26]. Project
iTrust has 235 JSP files and we use all of them for this
evaluation. We seek to evaluate the following research
questions.
(1)Are the assumptions made in our approach valid in iTrust?
(2) How effective is the described approach at detecting XSS
vulnerabilities?
(3) How does XSS Unit-Testing compare with existing tools
in detecting vulnerabilities?
13
(4) What is the computational performance of the described
approach at detecting XSS vulnerabilities?
(5) How effective is the describe approach at auto-fixing
detected vulnerabilities?
A. Assumption Verification
We assume that all web pages can be executed in a unit
test environment without runtime errors. This implies that all
resources required to run these web pages, such as application
servers, database servers and external libraries are available
for both vulnerability detection and repair phases. These
requirements are met with the iTrust project. Each of the 235
JSP pages can be executed successfully as unit tests. We use
the Apache TomCat as application server and mySQL server as
the database. iTrust uses Apache StringEscapeUtils libraries to
encode the outputs and traditional JSP tags to generate outputs.
We assume that untrusted variables are independent of each
other. This means that if a unit test contains more than one
variable that may contain malicious input, we can find all XSS
vulnerabilities by testing each variable independently. Out of
2268 sinks in iTrust, 27 contain multi-variables. In all these
cases our encoding independence assumption is true.
We also assume that the JavaScript codes do not change
web context of sinks and server-side variables are only used
as values in JavaScript programs. We found these assumptions
are true in all cases in where server-side values are passed to
JavaScript blocks.
B. Vulnerability Detection
We compared our XSS unit testing approach with security
black box testing using a popular open source security testing
tool ZAP [9]. Table I summarizes our evaluation results.
TABLE I: Summary of vulnerability findings
Detected Vuln. True Positives False Positives
ZAP 119 10 109
XSS Unit Tesing 24 24 0
We found 24 zero-day vulnerabilities due to misuse of
encoders. The following code snippet provides an example
from iTrust where HTML encoding is used in a JavaScript
context.
<a onclick="func('<%= escapeHtml(input)
%>')" > Link</a>
ZAP has a very high false positive rate: 91%. No false
positives were reported by our approach. The reason for ZAP’s
high false positive rate is because it does not confirm findings
through execution. Instead it uses string matches to find attack
scripts in output pages, as illustrated in section IV.
Our approach found 14 vulnerabilities ZAP did not find. All
these cases are due to the lack of test coverage by ZAP. ZAP
does not test all execution paths. In our approach, a separate
XSS unit test is created for each possible execution branch in
a JSP file. In addition, some vulnerabilities are triggered by
events, such as failure to load an image. Our test evaluation
approach handles such situations.
C. Attack Generation
We compared our grammar based attack generation with
two well regarded open source XSS attack repositories: ZAP
repository and the HTML5Sec web site [17]. The HTML5Sec
attack repository found fewer vulnerabilities than the ZAP
repository. However, we found several vulnerabilities that
cannot be detected by ZAP or HTML5Sec repositories. One
example is shown below.
<div style="height: <%= escapeHtml(inpu c
t) %>px; "> </div>
The following attack string generated by our approach can
detect this vulnerability.
;background-image:url('javascript:atk() c
');
Attack repositories in ZAP and HTML5Sec rely on contri-
butions from pen-testing experts. Our approach systematically
derives attack strings based on a set of grammar rules modeling
the behavior of browsers interpreting JavaScript programs.
D. Computational performance
We looked at the performance of XSS unit testing using
experiments performed on a desktop Mac with a 2.7 GHz Intel
core i5 with 8GB RAM. Our attack generator produced 223
attack strings, which were applied to each unit test. For iTrust,
it takes 17 seconds on average to evaluate a XSS unit test.
A JSP file may contain multiple branches of execution paths
but only those containing sinks with tainted variables will be
tested. Our evaluation of 235 JSP pages in iTrust shows that
on average a JSP file leads to 29 XSS unit tests. On average,
if a JSP page contains no vulnerabilities, our approach will
take 493 seconds or 8.2 min to complete all the unit tests.
Generation of XSS unit tests is much faster than running all
the tests. Because each JSP file can be tested independently,
this approach lends well for parallel processing. Overall, we
believe the approach we described in this paper may scale well
for large applications.
E. Auto-Repair
We applied the described auto-fixing mechanism to all
24 vulnerabilities found in iTrust. Our approach is able to
automatically fix all of these vulnerabilities. Fig.28 shows an
example of a vulnerability on line 1 and its repaired version
on line 2. Line 1 shows a vulnerability due to incorrect use
of a HTML encoder (escapeHtml()) for JavaScript context
(onclick event attribute) for untrusted variable tempName.
This vulnerability can be exploited using an attack script like
’+ attack() + ’.
All iTrust vulnerabilities are of the pattern (a) and (b) in
Fig.19. The time required to evaluate each candidate encoder
is the same as the time required to evaluate the unit tests for
the vulnerability detection phase. On average it takes testing
for two candidate encoders before a fix is found.
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1 <a onclick= "fn('<%=
escapeHtml(user) %>')" > ... </a>
2 <a onclick= "fn('<%=
escapeJavascript( escapeHtml(user ))
%>')" >...</a>
Fig. 28: Vulnerable Code and Repaired Version
VIII. RELATED WORK
Vulnerability Detection: Researchers have investigated a
variety of prevention and detection techniques to mitigate XSS
vulnerabilities. Preventive approaches include secure program-
ming guides to inform developers how to use encoding func-
tions correctly. Well known guidelines include the OWASP
XSS cheat sheet [24] and best practices by Graff and Wyk [27].
Attempts have been made to automatically sanitize untrusted
inputs using template languages. As we discussed in the I,
approaches for auto sanitization via type inference [2], [28]
come with limitations. Technological restrictions, such as the
use of template languages, means such approaches are not
widely applicable to many legacy web applications.
Johns et al. [29] have developed an abstract data type that
strictly enforces data and code separation in a host language
such as Java. However, this approach comes with a significant,
25%, run-time overhead. ScriptGard [28] is a run-time auto-
sanitization technique in ASP.Net similar to Haldar et. al [30]
for Java and WASP for SQL injection [20]. Advantages of
these approaches are that they can automatically sanitize large
scale legacy systems using a path-sensitive approach using
binary code instrumentation. All these approaches require a
runtime component that could incur runtime overheads. Fur-
thermore, requiring a runtime component necessitates changes
to existing infrastructures, such as browsers. Our approach
works with all web languages (HTML, CSS, JavaScript) and
requires no runtime support.
Static analysis techniques are widely used to detect XSS
vulnerabilities using taint analysis techniques [31]–[35]. The
main disadvantage of static analysis is high false positive rates
[3]. Furthermore, static analysis tools can only check for the
existence of the sanitization functions and not evaluate their
effectiveness [36]. This limits the capability of static analysis
to address the context-sensitiveness of sanitization errors [37].
Dynamic analysis techniques aim to evaluate application
responses to detect any sanitization mistakes [38]–[41]. In
the case of the black box testing, different algorithms such
as combinatorial testing [42], [43], pattern-based algorithms
[44], [45], and attack repositories [33] have been explored.
Duchene et al. [15], [44] proposed a control- and data- flow
aware fuzzing technique. They use a state-aware crawler to
record application requests and responses and use them to infer
an application’s control and data flow. The fuzzing process
is then guided by this information. The advantage of data
flow inference is that it enables more accurate detection of
stored XSS vulnerabilities. Because crawling-based inference
is source-code independent and it uses automatic form filling
and pruning techniques, the inferred control flow may not be
complete, leading to potentially high false negatives. In con-
trast, we utilize source code analysis to extract all execution
paths to avoid missing any sinks.
McAllister et. al [46] proposed an interactive black-box
vulnerability scanner. They aim to increase test coverage by
leveraging user activities through guided fuzzing. However,
relying on user activities to increases test coverage is not
complete and can lead to false negatives.
There are other types of XSS sanitization functions (other
than encoders) not addressed by our approach. Consider a
blogging web site allowing the use of HTML markup tags
as input. HTML encoding functions are not proper here
because they would disable all HTML markup tags. There
are heuristic filters, e.g. [25], that try to block unwanted
JavaScript programs in HTML body context. Such filters are
difficult to verify automatically.
Vulnerability Repair: Various patch generation and vulner-
ability repair mechanisms have been developed by researchers.
Medeiros et al. introduced a vulnerability detection and correc-
tion technique based on static analysis and machine learning.
They define a fix as adding an encoder instead of replacing an
an existing encoder, which can have side effects on the logic
of the code such as over encoding [47].
Yu et al. [48] proposed an automata-based input validation
mechanism for web applications. Given predefined attack
signatures and benign input patterns (e.g, date, URLs, IP ad-
dresses) they check the input strings to find malicious patterns.
Once an input matches a malicious signatures they generate
encoding patches to modify the inputs . This approach does not
necessarily prevent XSS attacks because encoding is context-
sensitive and no context detection is provided in this work.
Other approaches have addressed different vulnerabilities. For
example, FixMeUp [49] is an access-control repair tool for
web applications based on static-analysis. Ma et al. introduced
CDRep [50] as an automatic repair tool for cryptographic
defects in Android applications. They use decompilation and
fault identification to detect cryptographic misuse defects.
Pattern-based Automatic program Repair(PAR) [51] is a
general software repair mechanism that learns from previous
code repairs (manually done by developers) to automatically
generate code patches. It is similar to GenProg [52] by Weimer
et al. which uses a genetic-programming-based approach for
patch generation. Learning from examples is the technique
used in VuRLE [53] as an automatic vulnerability detection
and repair tool.
None of these vulnerability repair techniques are applicable
to repair XSS vulnerabilities due to encoder misuse. Our
approach goes further then repairing by verifying suggested
repairs by unit testing.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In summary, we propose a unit testing approach to detect
and repair cross-site scripting vulnerabilities caused by incor-
rect encoder usage. This approach can be easily integrated
into existing software development practices and can pinpoint
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the location of a vulnerability in the source code. It can
help developers find and fix XSS vulnerabilities early in the
development cycle, when they unit test their code, without in-
volving security experts. The grammar-based attack generation
is a structured way to generate XSS attack strings. We were
able to generate tests for vulnerabilities missed by popular
attack repositories. More importantly, our grammar models can
be modified to cover unknown or new attack scenarios. For
example, a new version of a browser may offer new ways
for attackers. Our approach also has low false positive rates.
Our evaluation suggests that our unit-test based approach to
detect XSS vulnerabilities is computationally feasible for large
applications and can detect vulnerabilities that cannot be found
using black-box fuzzing systems.
Our evaluation also suggest that the auto-fixing technique
described in this paper can repair many XSS vulnerabilities
in web applications by replacing erroneous encoders without
making structural changes to the program.
This work can be extended in a number of ways. We plan
to extend auto-repair to include code restructuring, addressing
one of the limitations of our current approach. More evaluation
with open source projects is also needed to further validate
and improve our approach. We plan to extend our work to
handle security sinks in client-side code that use asynchronous
calls to web services and JSON-based communications. This
extension requires JavaScript static analysis to find and repair
vulnerabilities in hybrid mobile applications as well.
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